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Placing the future center stage as a way of understanding cognition is gaining attention
in psychology. The general modern label for this is “prospection” which refers to the
process of representing and thinking about possible future states of the world. Several
theorists have claimed that episodic and prospective memory, as well as hypothetical
thinking (mental simulation) and conditional reasoning are necessary cognitive faculties
that enable prospection. Given the limitations in current empirical efforts connecting these
faculties to prospection, the aim of this mini review is to argue that the findings show that
they are sufficient, but not necessary for prospection. As a result, the short concluding
section gives an outline of an alternative conceptualization of prospection. The proposal
is that the critical characteristics of prospection are the discovery of, and maintenance of
goals via causal learning.
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INTRODUCTION
Prospection refers to the process of representing and planning
for possible future states of the world (Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007;
Seligman et al., 2013). Several recent reviews in human psychol-
ogy (e.g., Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010; Seligman et al.,
2013), along with an ensuing debate in comparative psychology
have helped draw attention to the role of prospection in cognition
(animal and human) (e.g., Raby and Clayton, 2009; Roberts and
Feeney, 2009; Suddendorf et al., 2009; de Waal and Ferrari, 2010).
What this mini review does differently to extant reviews is to: (1)
describe current theoretical thinking on the necessary cognitive
requirements of prospection, (2) discuss the empirical problems
concerning the necessary cognitive requirements of prospection,
and (3) propose an alternative conceptualization of prospection.
POINT 1: COGNITIVE REQUIREMENTS OF PROSPECTION
Many theorists (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Gilbert and Wilson,
2007; McDaniel and Einstein, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007;
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007) claim that episodic memory
and prospective memory are essential for prospective cogni-
tion. Episodic memory is most commonly defined as autobi-
ographical memory of experiences that encapsulate thoughts,
emotions, motivations, perceptions and beliefs at the time
of a personally experienced event. These types of memories
provide the informational content that enables simulation of
future experiences and outcomes. By extension, prospective mem-
ory is the tagging of intentions onto episodic representations;
the intentions to act may connect to a specific future con-
text (event-based prospective memory) or to a specific future
time interval (time-based prospective memory) (McDaniel and
Einstein, 2007). Gollwitzer (1999) refers to the time and context
as implementation intentions whereas goal intentions contain
details of the desired outcome of the intended action. Critically,
all prospective memories are retrieved in the absence of exter-
nal reminders. This means that in order to execute the intended
action, people must keep active in memory conditional represen-
tations (e.g., if context/time X occurs, I must perform action Y)
(Gollwitzer, 1999). In order to form representations of the future
an individual needs to deconstruct and recombine currently held
representations in order to form expectations of possible out-
comes. For this reason Gilbert and Wilson (2007) propose that
hypothetical thinking is essential for prospective thinking, this is
because it is a process by which symbols can be manipulated in
such a way as to enable prospective thinking. Hypothetical think-
ing is a means to inferring and imagining the emotional, motoric,
and sensory details of events that are fantastical (e.g., riding a uni-
corn) or unfamiliar (e.g., being President of the United States).
In parallel to this, Seligman et al. (2013) emphasize the role of
reasoning in prospection by proposing that prospective thoughts
are structured as conditionals (e.g., if X, then Y). As a result, in
order to think prospectively, the essential requirements are to
construct and evaluate conditional propositions. However, others
propose that conditional reasoning is a pre-requisite for hypo-
thetical thinking, rather than simply accompanying it (Rescher,
1961). It is also worth noting that Seligman et al.’s (2013) pro-
posals dovetail Gollwitzer’s (1999) claims concerning prospective
memory because implementation intentions are structured in the
form of conditionals.
POINT 2: PROBLEMS AND EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES
Given the strong theoretical claims concerning the necessary
components of prospection, the following section critically exam-
ines the evidence for these claims.
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Episodic memory and prospective memory
Evidence in support of the essential role of episodic memory in
prospective thinking comes in two forms. One is in the form
of neuro-imaging studies. If regions in the brain are associated
with episodic memory then they should become active when
prospective thinking is engaged, which is indeed the case (Spreng
and Grady, 2010; Gerlach et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2013). For
instance, Addis et al.’s (2007) study involved scanning participants
while they imagined themselves experiencing an event based on
cued words (e.g., star, dress) and a specified time horizon (e.g.,
past week, next week, past year, next year), and asking them to
describe the events after being scanned. Addis et al. (2007) found
that the region associated with episodic memory (i.e., medial left
pre-frontal parietal) was also active during imagining of past and
future events.
The other form of support is based on clinical studies. The
idea being patients with impaired episodic memory should also
show impaired prospective thinking, which has also found sup-
port (Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; Irish et al., 2012).
When Klein et al. (2002) compared patient D. B. (aged 78) with
severe anterograde amnesia with two healthy age matched con-
trols, D. B. showed impaired performance on tests of recollection
of past experiences, as expected, but inaccurate responses to test of
prospective memory (e.g., How will you spend next Christmas?).
However, when compared to healthy age-matched controls,
the evidence from clinical studies of patients with Autism,
Schizophrenia, Depression, and Impulse-control problems also
reveals impairments in prospective thinking (Wallace, 1956;
O’Connor et al., 2000; MacLeod et al., 2005; Bechara et al., 2006;
D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Lind and Bowler, 2010; Griffiths et al.,
2012). These findings are problematic for several reasons. For a
start, not all of these clinical populations have impairments to
episodic memory, and they don’t all show the same deficit in
prospective thinking; this may be due to the fact that the mea-
sures of prospection are not consistently the same across studies.
If there are any consistent patterns across studies they indicate
that patients have difficulty in generating examples of prospective
positive events as compared to generating prospective negative
events.
The focus here has been on episodic memory because most
theorists have made stronger claims concerning its essential role
in prospection. Nevertheless, there is an amassing literature on
prospective memory which has demonstrated its close connec-
tions with the execution of future actions of intentions to act
out simple behaviors (see McDaniel and Einstein, 2007). As with
episodic memory, the clinical studies on impairments to prospec-
tive memory paint a complex and mixed picture. A recent review
of clinical studies of patients with Schizophrenia (Ordemann
et al., 2014) showed that impairments in prospective thinking are
better explained by lifestyle factors than neuropsychological fac-
tors. This strongly implies that there is a complex interconnected
set of factors that underpin prospective cognition that are no yet
fully understood.
Hypothetical thinking
As discussed earlier, connections have been drawn between
episodic memory and hypothetical thinking (Buckner and
Carroll, 2007; Baird et al., 2011). The proposed argument is
that evidence for the association between episodic memory and
prospective thinking in turn implies an association between
hypothetical thinking and prospection. However, this is rather
an indirect form of evidence for a link between hypothetical
thinking and prospection. In addition, hypothetical thinking is
also thought to include mind-wandering, imagining, and men-
tal simulation—which again provides indirect evidence for an
association between hypothetical thinking and prospection (Van
Boven et al., 2009; Christian et al., 2013). Attempts to demon-
strate associations between imagining and prospection are in their
infancy, and as yet the evidence is unconvincing. For instance,
Christian et al. (2013) presented participants with a mental sim-
ulation task. The critical manipulation involved either imagining
activities happening next week, or 10 years from now. Christian
et al. (2013) found that, for the proximal time scale, the degree
of detail of the drawing of the activities varied according to how
involved the activity was. While the aim was to show that the con-
tent of imagination is affected by what we are expected to do in the
future, the findings failed to show that there was any difference in
the details when thinking about different activities into the distant
future; suggesting that imaginationmay be weak when it comes to
thinking prospectively far into the future.
Conditionals
The general claim by Seligman et al. (2013) is that expectations
and predictions of future events are structured in the form of
conditionals, and by the same token, thinking of future events
must involve conditional reasoning. There is however limited
work to support this. De Brigard and Giovanello (2012) com-
pared descriptions of positive or negative events that had either
happened (episodic memories), could happen (future events in
the form of conditionals) and could have happened (in the form
of counterfactuals). They found that there were more sensory
and spatial details in the episodic memories than the other two
types of descriptions. However, there was no difference between
the details for future and counterfactual events, which suggests
that conditionals concerning future events don’t per se take on
a different status or are processed differently as compared to
counterfactuals.
With the exception of some neuroimaging evidence and
some work in prospective memory, all other claims concerning
the apparent necessary connection between the core cognitive
requisites (i.e., episodic memory, prospective memory, hypo-
thetical thinking, conditional representations), and prospection
exceed the evidence. Moreover, no evidence thus far suggests
that these cognitive processes have a core functional basis in
prospective thinking. In addition, the methods used to examine
prospective thinking appear to be limited to imagining future
events, with the exception of prospective memory which often
involves simple reaction time tasks. Thus, far, none of the studies
examine the influence of goals (goal development/goal discov-
ery) on prospective thinking. They also don’t examine plan-
ning behaviors for future events, and they do not test causal
knowledge which would be involved in establishing how future
events would be brought about (with the exception of theo-
retical work by Gollwitzer, 1999). Therefore, it appears that
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the claims made thus far can only demonstrate that episodic
memory, prospective memory, hypothetical thinking, and con-
ditional representations are sufficient, but not necessary for
prospection.
POINT 3: AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PROSPECTION
The main thrust of the alternative conceptualization that I will
propose here is designed to tackle a critical gap highlighted in
the previous section concerning research on prospection, and
that is examining the role of planning and causal learning in
prospection; both of which are under-researched, but also criti-
cal to prospective cognition. Why? The key claim I make (see also
Osman, 2014) is that goals are by definition prospects. By explor-
ing our environment we learn to discover ways of maintaining
what we need (food, water, shelter), but also extended our reach
(developing new skills and knowledge), both of which require
representations of the future in the form of goals. Our ability to
construct representations of the future and adapt to future out-
comes is built on basic contingency learning mechanisms that
generate expectations and plans of actions. Expectations and
plans of action are guided by the discovery of, and maintenance
of goals (e.g., Kempton, 1986; Osman, 2010, 2014; Pezzulo and
Rigoli, 2011). We are able to reach our goals by learning to asso-
ciate planned actions with intended outcomes (Strathman et al.,
1994; Karniol and Ross, 1996). Thus, the core argument proposed
here is that, if goals are prospects, and contingency learning con-
nects actions with intended outcomes guided by goals (a view
endorsed by Gollwitzer, 1999 and Seligman et al., 2013), then
planning and causal learning are essential properties of prospec-
tion, because they enable us to represent how to act in the future.
The strong claim being made here is that accurate representations
of the future will depend on the accuracy of causal representa-
tions that support the planned actions needed to achieve a future
goal. One prediction to come from this framework would be that
the more people unpack their causal beliefs and the consequences
of their actions in achieving future goals, the higher their judg-
ments of likelihood will be of achieving the goals in the future,
which is also in line with Tversky and Kohler’s (1994) Support
Theory.
Finally, the debate in the comparative literature surrounding
prospection is based on whether or not the four cognitive com-
ponents reviewed here are either unique to humans or not; if
they are, then only humans possess prospective cognition. This
review has argued that the evidence suggest that the four core
faculties are not necessary for prospection. Instead alternative fac-
ulties such as contingency learning, which non-humans animals
possess, may underpin prospective cognition, which means that
representing and adapting to the future is not uniquely human
(Osman, 2014).
REFERENCES
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., and Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past
and imagining the future: common and distinct neural substrates during
event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45, 1363–1377. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., and Schooler, J. W. (2011). Back to the future: autobio-
graphical planning and the functionality of mind-wandering. Conscious. Cogn.
20, 1604–1611. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.007
Bechara, A., Noel, X., and Crone, E. A. (2006). “Loss of willpower:
abnormal neural mechanisms of impulse control and decision mak-
ing in addiction,” in Handbook of Implicit Cognition and Addiction,
eds R. W. Wiers and A. W. Stacy. (Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE),
215–232.
Buckner, R. L., and Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 11, 49–57. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004
Christian, B. M., Miles, L. K., Fung, F. H. K., Best, S., andMacrae, C. N. (2013). The
shape of things to come: exploring goal-directed prospection. Conscious. Cogn.
22, 471–478. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.02.002
Cooper, N., Kable, J. W., Kim, B. K., and Zauberman, G. (2013). Brain activ-
ity in valuation regions while thinking about the future predicts individual
discount rates. J. Neurosci. 33, 13150–13156. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0400-
13.2013
D’Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., and Van der Linden, M. (2008). Remembering
the past and imagining the future in schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 117,
247–251. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.117.1.247
De Brigard, F., and Giovanello, K. S. (2012). Influence of outcome valence
in the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfac-
tual thinking. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1085–1096. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.
06.007
de Waal, F., and Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective
on animal and human cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 201–207. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2010.03.003
Gerlach, K. D., Spreng, R. N., Gilmore, A. W., and Schacter, D. L. (2011).
Solving future problems: default network and executive activity associ-
ated with goal-directed mental simulations. Neuroimage 55, 1816–1824. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.01.030
Gilbert, D. T., and Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: experiencing the future.
Science 317, 1351–1354. doi: 10.1126/science.1144161
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: strong effects of simple plans.
Am. Psychol. 54, 493–503. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.493
Griffiths, A., Hill, R., Morgan, C., Rendell, P. G., Karimi, K., Wanagaratne, S.,
et al. (2012). Prospective memory and future event simulation in individu-
als with alcohol dependence. Addiction 107, 1809–1816. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-
0443.2012.03941.x
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., and Piguet, O. (2012). Considering the
role of semantic memory in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic
dementia. Brain 135, 2178–2191. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws119
Karniol, R., and Ross, M. (1996). The motivational impact of temporal focus:
thinking about the future and the past. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 47, 593–620. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.47.1.593
Kempton, W. (1986). Two theories of home heat control. Cogn. Sci. 10, 75–90. doi:
10.1207/s15516709cog1001_3
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., and Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal expe-
rience: the effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient’s ability
to remember the past and imagine the future. Soc. Cogn. 20, 353–379. doi:
10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125
Lind, S. E., and Bowler, D. M. (2010). Episodic memory and episodic future
thinking in adults with autism. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 119, 896–905. doi:
10.1037/a0020631
MacLeod, A. K., Tata, P., Tyrer, P., Schmidt, U., Davidson, K., and Thompson, S.
(2005). Hopelessness and positive and negative future thinking in parasuicide.
Br. J. Clin. Psychol. 44, 495–504. doi: 10.1348/014466505X35704
McDaniel, M. A., and Einstein, G. O. (2007). Prospective Memory: An Overview and
Synthesis of An Emerging Field. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
O’Connor, R. C., Connery, H., and Cheyne, W. M. (2000). Hopelessness: the role of
depression, future directed thinking and cognitive vulnerability. Psychol. Health
Med. 5, 155–161. doi: 10.1080/713690188
Ordemann, G. J., Opper, J., and Davalos, D. (2014). Prospective memory in
schizophrenia: a review. Schizophr. Res. 155, 77–89. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2014.
03.008
Osman, M. (2010). Controlling Uncertainty: Learning and Decision Making in
Complex Worlds. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell Publishers. doi: 10.1002/97814443
28226
Osman, M. (2014). Future-Minded: The Psychology of Agency and Control.
Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Pezzulo, G., and Rigoli, F. (2011). The value of foresight: how prospection affects
decision-making. Front. Neurosci. 5:79. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00079
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 626 | 3
Osman Essentials for prospection
Raby, C. R., and Clayton, N. S. (2009). Prospective cognition in animals. Behav.
Process. 80, 314–324. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2008.12.005
Race, E., Keane, M. M., and Verfaellie, M. (2011). Medial temporal lobe dam-
age causes deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thinking not
attributable to deficits in narrative construction. J. Neurosci. 31, 10262–10269.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1145-11.2011
Rescher, N. (1961). Belief-contravening suppositions. Philos. Rev. 70, 176–196. doi:
10.2307/2183237
Roberts, W. A., and Feeney, M. C. (2009). The comparative study of men-
tal time travel. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 271–277. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.
03.003
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to
imagine the future: the prospective brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 657–661. doi:
10.1038/nrn2213
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation of
future events: concepts, data, and applications.Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 39–60.
doi: 10.1196/annals.1440.001
Seligman, M. E., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., and Sripada, C. (2013). Navigating
Into the Future or Driven by the Past. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 8, 119–141. doi:
10.1177/1745691612474317
Spreng, R. N., and Grady, C. L. (2010). Patterns of brain activity supporting
autobiographical memory, prospection, and theory of mind, and their rela-
tionship to the default mode network. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 2, 1112–1123. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2009.21282
Strathman, A., Gleicher, F., Boninger, D. S., and Edwards, C. S. (1994). The
consideration of future consequences: weighing immediate and distant out-
comes of behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 66, 742–752. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.
66.4.742
Suddendorf, T., Addis, D. R., and Corballis, M. C. (2009). Mental time travel and
the shaping of the humanmind. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1317–1324.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0301
Suddendorf, T., and Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: what is
mental time travel, and is it unique to humans? Behav. Brain Sci. 30, 299–312.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07001975
Szpunar, K. K. (2010). Episodic future thought: an emerging concept. Perspect.
Psychol. Sci. 5, 142–162. doi: 10.1177/1745691610362350
Tversky, A., and Koehler, D. (1994). Support theory: a nonextensional represen-
tation of subjective probability. Psychol. Rev. 101, 547–567. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.101.4.547
Van Boven, L., Kane, J., and McGraw, A. P. (2009). “Temporally asymmetric
constraints on mental simulation: retrospection is more constrained than
prospection,” in The Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation, eds K.
D. Markman, W. M. P. Klein, and J. A. Suhr (New York, NY: Psychology Press),
131–147.
Wallace, M. (1956). Future time perspective in schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Soc.
Psychol. 52, 240–245. doi: 10.1037/h0039899
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 04 March 2014; accepted: 02 June 2014; published online: 30 June 2014.
Citation: Osman M (2014) What are the essential cognitive requirements for prospec-
tion (thinking about the future)? Front. Psychol. 5:626. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00626
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Osman. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 626 | 4
